After a very tiresome attempt by the UK to manipulate what has been clearly established law, Strasbourg reasserts (On February 28, 2008) the following:
"Article 3, which prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15, even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation...as the prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute, irrespective of the victim's conduct...the nature of the offence allegedly committed by the applicant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3" (para. 127).
A number of intriguing discussions have taken place in the blog-world (see invisiblecollegeblog.com) over the ECHR's judgment in the case of Saadi v Italy (following the jurisprudential practice over Article 3 and the absolute prohibition on torture and the absolute obligation of non-refoulement upheld in Soering v United Kingdom). I was amused by the possibility of marrying these forces for the protection of a terrorist's right to life and the right not to be tortured in the present climate that Western societies are experiencing, with the ongoing elaboration of anti-terrorist legislation (both directly and indirectly speaking, i.e. administrative detention, restrictions on immigration and asylum law, etc) and the discussion I have already undertaken in the context of the AG's opinion on Kaadi in a previous post. This includes equally theoretical questions on objects and subjects (identity and the other) in terms of the 'securing humanity' discourse.
The question is whether the clash between Article 3 ECHR (that of the person subjected to a deportation order) and Article 2 ECHR (that of the population of any of the European capitals that could become the victims of a terrorist attack) has hereby been resolved? The Court asserts that "the prospect that [a person] may pose a serious threat to the community if not returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill-treatment that the person may be subject to on return" (para 139). A fortiori, there no "balancing exercise" (between the obligation of non-refoulement and the "risk" or "dangerousness" of the person) to be admitted, not at the level of asserting the facts and indisputably not at that of applying the law. However if this is the case, I would ask whether these examinations are not made futile by the ongoing developments in national terrorist legislation? One could also observe this parallel by asking whether this not just another incident of 'the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing'?
The ramifications that could logically be expected are nuclear; namely, a call to review all existing and developing national terrorist legislation (or even a drafting of a more detailed common anti-terror legislation and Brussels-based enforceability mechanisms) and a reconsideration of a notable number of ongoing cases for the deportation of those persons responsible for a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation."
There is a clear lack of legislation in the form of directives or regulations that specify the requirements or limitations on the substantive scope of the provisions. Inoperative traits on the political and social levels are doomed to continue at this pace. A number of penetrative conclusions have come out of recent research in the field of comparative law and the law of the European Union pointing to the fact that the national interpretation, transposition, and implementation of EU legislative measures shows an unspeakable number of discrepancies and divergences amongst member states (even, and predominantly, between the civilists). In light of these growing divergences, and an absence of an action plan for reconciliation, it may be difficult to ensure, if such legislation were issued by the Community in the future, that it is implemented in an effective and unified manner.
I would be intrigued to hear from those that perceive the current state of the law (both nationally in theUK and regionally) as sufficiently descriptive and instructive for curtailing the tendencies that characterize emerging anti-terrorist legislation. I would also be interested to digest some new interdisciplinary perspectives on the developments of this legal framework and the preventative mechanisms that we aspire to construct in order to accommodate these actors in the current national, regional and international legal orders.Without further pontification, I concede that it is a very burdensome and extended endeavor.
Showing posts with label Humanity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Humanity. Show all posts
Tuesday, 25 March 2008
Wednesday, 19 March 2008
Military residents and a reinterpreted principle of 'distinction'
Another series of armed exchanges are taking place in the Gaza strip and we are once against appalled by the non-application and utter (non-gymnastic) defiance of the most fundamental principles of the law of war(forgetting only for a second about its misapplications and misinterpretations).
"Many areas of international law are vague. They can be interpreted in different ways. The situation in Gaza, for example, has no parallel anywhere else in the world. It's all open. So there are interpreters who want to interpret the law in such a way as to limit us as much as possible, and there are interpreters who are more convenient for us," says Israeli Justice Minister Friedmann, when asked about the perceived legality of attacking military targets in densely populated residential areas.
It seems not only that the Israeli government has yet to discern the actual purpose of its offensive or the moralist questions that surrounds the bad, good and evil (I turn you to a remarkably 'interesting' piece by David Horovitz, the Jerusalem Post's editor-in-chief who holds that the misconceptions of the international media are "an aberration that highlights how poorly 'our' complex conflict is understood") (emphasis added), but neither has it had enough time to position itself in relation to the relevant interpretational discourses surrounding the relevant jus in bello provisions.
The set of rules governing the attack strategies of a militarised territorial entity (outlined in Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions (AP I)) against another are a self-applicable and clear framework. Suggesting a degree of complexity, in order to brush matters aside, the applicability (or rather malleability) of the existing law to wars against terrorist organizations is put at doubt.
The matter should be very simple, and action should commence with the adherence to and non-violation of the most fundamental of all principles - civilian immunity and the principle of distinction (the 'basic rule' in Article 48, AP I, to distinguish between civilians and combatants and to target only the latter). These questions remind us of the ones asked before, during and after the American aerial attacks on railways and television towers in Kosovo (granted these were cases of Aerial bombardments and the standards, it has been conceded, are different). These elaborate debates brought us to (un)clear conclusion that each case, and each target, needs to be considered on its own merits - namely, the end achieved by the action must outweigh the damage caused by it. This balancing of facts is to be done in accordance with the second most fundamental tenet of the laws of war, the basic principle of proportionality (Art 51(5)(b) AP I). The problematic is inherent to the definition of a "military target", the question of precision, the precautionary measures (Art 57, AP I) undertaken before and during the attack, etc.
We are faced by a recurring dilemma of IHL, exemplified similarly in the morbid 'one-ton bomb' incident of the house of Saleh Shehadeh in Gaza, which killed 14 civilians, including 8 children. In other words, considering the problematic of evidencing each and every attack in the current conflict frenzy and the hopeless reliance on post-conflictual accountability proceedings (a good example taken from Winograd, see earlier post), it is arguable that these targeting considerations need to be institutionalised as a procedural aspect of the earlier stages of the military decision-making processes. This will unquestionably be the only effective means for assuring that these provisions are at least considered, if not properly implemented. At the same time, this appears absolutely unfathomable in practice.
I suggest (as many international NGOs have done before) that the question to be asked should be much cruder. If we (i.e. laymen), and specifically the media, is able to distinguish (when numbering the casualties) between the civilian and the armed 'combatant', why and how is the legal norm so 'very' dynamically instrumentalised (or altogether ignored)to justify what are, prima facie, clear violations of the most basic and fundamental tenet of international humanitarian law, the principle of distinction?
"Many areas of international law are vague. They can be interpreted in different ways. The situation in Gaza, for example, has no parallel anywhere else in the world. It's all open. So there are interpreters who want to interpret the law in such a way as to limit us as much as possible, and there are interpreters who are more convenient for us," says Israeli Justice Minister Friedmann, when asked about the perceived legality of attacking military targets in densely populated residential areas.
It seems not only that the Israeli government has yet to discern the actual purpose of its offensive or the moralist questions that surrounds the bad, good and evil (I turn you to a remarkably 'interesting' piece by David Horovitz, the Jerusalem Post's editor-in-chief who holds that the misconceptions of the international media are "an aberration that highlights how poorly 'our' complex conflict is understood") (emphasis added), but neither has it had enough time to position itself in relation to the relevant interpretational discourses surrounding the relevant jus in bello provisions.
The set of rules governing the attack strategies of a militarised territorial entity (outlined in Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions (AP I)) against another are a self-applicable and clear framework. Suggesting a degree of complexity, in order to brush matters aside, the applicability (or rather malleability) of the existing law to wars against terrorist organizations is put at doubt.
The matter should be very simple, and action should commence with the adherence to and non-violation of the most fundamental of all principles - civilian immunity and the principle of distinction (the 'basic rule' in Article 48, AP I, to distinguish between civilians and combatants and to target only the latter). These questions remind us of the ones asked before, during and after the American aerial attacks on railways and television towers in Kosovo (granted these were cases of Aerial bombardments and the standards, it has been conceded, are different). These elaborate debates brought us to (un)clear conclusion that each case, and each target, needs to be considered on its own merits - namely, the end achieved by the action must outweigh the damage caused by it. This balancing of facts is to be done in accordance with the second most fundamental tenet of the laws of war, the basic principle of proportionality (Art 51(5)(b) AP I). The problematic is inherent to the definition of a "military target", the question of precision, the precautionary measures (Art 57, AP I) undertaken before and during the attack, etc.
We are faced by a recurring dilemma of IHL, exemplified similarly in the morbid 'one-ton bomb' incident of the house of Saleh Shehadeh in Gaza, which killed 14 civilians, including 8 children. In other words, considering the problematic of evidencing each and every attack in the current conflict frenzy and the hopeless reliance on post-conflictual accountability proceedings (a good example taken from Winograd, see earlier post), it is arguable that these targeting considerations need to be institutionalised as a procedural aspect of the earlier stages of the military decision-making processes. This will unquestionably be the only effective means for assuring that these provisions are at least considered, if not properly implemented. At the same time, this appears absolutely unfathomable in practice.
I suggest (as many international NGOs have done before) that the question to be asked should be much cruder. If we (i.e. laymen), and specifically the media, is able to distinguish (when numbering the casualties) between the civilian and the armed 'combatant', why and how is the legal norm so 'very' dynamically instrumentalised (or altogether ignored)to justify what are, prima facie, clear violations of the most basic and fundamental tenet of international humanitarian law, the principle of distinction?
Tuesday, 12 February 2008
A fruitless Winograd and the obligation to effectively investigate, prosecute, and punish
Yaron Ezrahi, a political scientist at Hebrew University, said he believed that Mr. Olmert’s days were numbered, because Israeli leaders “rise and fall” on their war leadership. “There has never been a case in Israeli history that an authoritative commission said something so blunt about a war that took the lives of soldiers and the lives of civilians, that blamed so bluntly the political decision makers for the failure of the war,” he said (see NYtimes.com). The report harshly criticizes the practices of government and the performance of the military, but pays no more than lip service to a core pillar of the laws of war - the obligation to effectively investigate, prosecute, and punish in the aftermath of a conflict.
The government has the right to establish such commissions that are necessary to investigate matters of public concern, namely those regarding military activities. The problem that the Commission incurred in this process was a result of the mixing between the question of the Report itself (content and form) and the parallel, but ostracized, question of what is to come as a result of these fact-finding exercises, who and how will be prosecuted and punished.
The question that is asked, in the shadow of this post-Winograd anguish, is what are independent investigatory commissions good for? and, to what extent are post-conflict investigatory obligations (namely, Article 132, Geneva Convention III and Article 149, Geneva Convention IV) effective, if at all relevant to the twenty-first century war climate.
The manner in which this particular enquiry was conducted perverses the very foundations of these simple but imperative legal norms. The law outlines as follows: An enquiry shall be carried out as soon as possible by a Commission instituted for each particular case, and comprising three neutral members selected from a list of qualified persons drawn up by the High Contracting Parties in time of peace, each Party nominating four such persons. The plaintiff and defendant States shall each appoint one member of the Commission. The third member shall be designated by the other two, and should they disagree, by the President of the International Court of Justice or, should the latter be a national of a belligerent State, by the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC consultations on Art 132). The Parties to the conflict undertake to punish those responsible (para 3, Art 132).
Although it was not vested with the powers of an official state commission of investigation, it had the power to subpoena witnesses and recommend the prosecution of officials it found to have been responsible for wilful or negligent criminal conduct. Essentially, the whole procedure adopted an approach to which we have become slightly too accustomed - it brushed aside available evidence of serious violations of international law, claiming that interpretations of international humanitarian law are controversial, that it did not have the capacity to deal with the volume of data. Finally, it did not propose any concrete measures for the prosecution of the responsible state organs (Amnesty International reports).
Excerpts from a press release summarizing the highlights of the 617 page report convey the following helpless reverberations:
Most damningly:
Is this it - done and dusted?
The government has the right to establish such commissions that are necessary to investigate matters of public concern, namely those regarding military activities. The problem that the Commission incurred in this process was a result of the mixing between the question of the Report itself (content and form) and the parallel, but ostracized, question of what is to come as a result of these fact-finding exercises, who and how will be prosecuted and punished.
The question that is asked, in the shadow of this post-Winograd anguish, is what are independent investigatory commissions good for? and, to what extent are post-conflict investigatory obligations (namely, Article 132, Geneva Convention III and Article 149, Geneva Convention IV) effective, if at all relevant to the twenty-first century war climate.
The manner in which this particular enquiry was conducted perverses the very foundations of these simple but imperative legal norms. The law outlines as follows: An enquiry shall be carried out as soon as possible by a Commission instituted for each particular case, and comprising three neutral members selected from a list of qualified persons drawn up by the High Contracting Parties in time of peace, each Party nominating four such persons. The plaintiff and defendant States shall each appoint one member of the Commission. The third member shall be designated by the other two, and should they disagree, by the President of the International Court of Justice or, should the latter be a national of a belligerent State, by the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC consultations on Art 132). The Parties to the conflict undertake to punish those responsible (para 3, Art 132).
Although it was not vested with the powers of an official state commission of investigation, it had the power to subpoena witnesses and recommend the prosecution of officials it found to have been responsible for wilful or negligent criminal conduct. Essentially, the whole procedure adopted an approach to which we have become slightly too accustomed - it brushed aside available evidence of serious violations of international law, claiming that interpretations of international humanitarian law are controversial, that it did not have the capacity to deal with the volume of data. Finally, it did not propose any concrete measures for the prosecution of the responsible state organs (Amnesty International reports).
Excerpts from a press release summarizing the highlights of the 617 page report convey the following helpless reverberations:
"Let us emphasize: when we imposed responsibility on a system, an echelon or a unit, we did not imply that the responsibility was only or mainly of those who headed it at the time of the war. Often, such responsibility stemmed from a variety of factors outside the control of those at the head. In addition, a significant part of the responsibility for the failures and flaws we have found lies with those who had been in charge of preparedness and readiness in the years before the war."
"Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon war as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages. The barrage of rockets aimed at Israel's civilian population lasted throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it...This offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed."
"All in all, the IDF failed, especially because of the conduct of the high command and the ground forces, to provide an effective military response to the challenge posed to it by the war in Lebanon, and thus failed to provide the political echelon with a military achievement that could have served as the basis for political and diplomatic action...[Seeking peace or managing the conflict must come from a position of social, political and military strength, and through the ability and willingness to fight for the state, its values and the security of its population even in the absence of peace.”
Most damningly:
"Our recommendations contain suggestions for systemic and deep changes in the modalities of thinking and acting of the political and military echelons and their interface, in both routine and emergency, including war. These are deep and critical processes. Their significance should not be obscured by current affairs, local successes or initial repairs. A persistent and prolonged effort, on many levels, will be needed in order to bring about the essential improvements in the ways of thinking and acting of the political-military systems."
Is this it - done and dusted?
Thursday, 10 January 2008
IHL - Toothless and delegalized in Jerusalem
Bush is visiting Olmert and Abbas in Jerusalem and Ramallah these days to engage in a series of toothless 'tittle tattle' on the jaded, politicized legal questions of Jerusalem, refugees and settlements that sit at the top of the agenda for the resolution of conflict and detangling of events in the region.
Mr. Bush declared this a “historic moment, a historic opportunity” to overcome the deep skepticism here and elsewhere that the peace efforts begun in Annapolis, Md., in November would succeed. (see NYTimes.com)
The senior official added that Israel was determined to continue building in Jerusalem, and that there was no change in the position on the issue despite the rare criticism by America's top diplomat. (see JPost.com)
If east-Jerusalem is not recognized as "occupied territory" under the Fourth Geneva Convention (regardless of the length of the occupation), if the right to return in international law is not afforded to the some 2 million Palestinian refugees, and if the rules of jus in bello pertaining to the conduct of the occupying power are not enforced, there is absolutely no place for soft, leaky diplomatic chatter. Or is there?
The aged state of international humanitarian law (IHL) has been a topic for debate in recent years with the emerging face of the twenty-first-century armed conflict (i.e. state against non-state actor). It's body being not only unsuitable for the traditional IHL outfit, but has further ripped this traditional outfit apart exposing its inherent deficiencies in operability.
In creating and maintaining the 'big prison', i.e. the Gaza Strip, for the past two years the Israeli authorities have been supported by American officials that had chosen to endorse 'national security' and 'the fight against terrorism' to negate hard rights, obligations and soft politico-legal agreements that today form the very creature of IHL and international human rights law.
Before the law is applied by both sides, even in the very denuded state in which it is found today, delegalised politics is a means for reinforcing the present state of paralysis and rejecting the validity of the fundamental aspirations of the international community for its peaceful coexistence and collective struggle against the horrors with which it is presently faced.
Mr. Bush declared this a “historic moment, a historic opportunity” to overcome the deep skepticism here and elsewhere that the peace efforts begun in Annapolis, Md., in November would succeed. (see NYTimes.com)
The senior official added that Israel was determined to continue building in Jerusalem, and that there was no change in the position on the issue despite the rare criticism by America's top diplomat. (see JPost.com)
If east-Jerusalem is not recognized as "occupied territory" under the Fourth Geneva Convention (regardless of the length of the occupation), if the right to return in international law is not afforded to the some 2 million Palestinian refugees, and if the rules of jus in bello pertaining to the conduct of the occupying power are not enforced, there is absolutely no place for soft, leaky diplomatic chatter. Or is there?
The aged state of international humanitarian law (IHL) has been a topic for debate in recent years with the emerging face of the twenty-first-century armed conflict (i.e. state against non-state actor). It's body being not only unsuitable for the traditional IHL outfit, but has further ripped this traditional outfit apart exposing its inherent deficiencies in operability.
In creating and maintaining the 'big prison', i.e. the Gaza Strip, for the past two years the Israeli authorities have been supported by American officials that had chosen to endorse 'national security' and 'the fight against terrorism' to negate hard rights, obligations and soft politico-legal agreements that today form the very creature of IHL and international human rights law.
Before the law is applied by both sides, even in the very denuded state in which it is found today, delegalised politics is a means for reinforcing the present state of paralysis and rejecting the validity of the fundamental aspirations of the international community for its peaceful coexistence and collective struggle against the horrors with which it is presently faced.
Thursday, 3 January 2008
International human wrongs in Kenya
The death toll is exceeding the 300s as the Kenyan people continue to fight against what was an openly rigged election process in dire hope to grab hold of what is left of their fundamental civil and political rights. The world is watching in awe.
Is this not an appropriate time to ask ourselves, the international community of state, non-state actors and individuals, a number of critical questions: where have the politico-legal norms for a fair and free election process originated (if not Western societies)? Why have the monitoring teams representing the European Union, and a considerable number of IGOs and NGOs disappeared in the midst of all this chaos? and Who is going to be the catalyst to bring about, if not at the very least support, the securing of peace in a nation found today in profound turmoil and despair.
The international system of governance has once again reaffirmed its state of utter impotence. Not even the UN Security Council reacts to the atrocities, let alone the UNHCHR and its organs. Our best bet, we seem to believe, is to leave them be altogether. Refraining from arousing even regional conversations amongst the African nations we choose to remain in our barracks, numbed by the lessons we think we should have learned from more recent humanitarian interventions. Sadly, still unable to realize that inaction and passivity is sure to secure neither us, nor humanity, a brighter, more stable and promising future.
Kenyans were praised for their utter dedication to the principles of democracy and the political process as they stood in line to the voting polls for hours. An expressive number of organizations and governmental delegations (less Pan-Africanist than expected) were on site to support the process and assure the purity of the demos (or demon in disguise) at work. A case that reminds us more recently of Nigeria and more boldly (remarking the inappropriate nature of such impossible-to-oversee puppet shows) of Iraq.
This is a very sorrowful implication of the unravelling nature of the operation of identity building that Western society has chosen to achieve through the institution of human rights, amongst others. Whose rights and where do they originate? About these we have blatantly forgotten. After all, Kenya today is a mirror of a people, reflecting the face of humanity, that 'want' to express the universal dignity bestowed upon them as human beings on account of their own humanity.
Is this not an appropriate time to ask ourselves, the international community of state, non-state actors and individuals, a number of critical questions: where have the politico-legal norms for a fair and free election process originated (if not Western societies)? Why have the monitoring teams representing the European Union, and a considerable number of IGOs and NGOs disappeared in the midst of all this chaos? and Who is going to be the catalyst to bring about, if not at the very least support, the securing of peace in a nation found today in profound turmoil and despair.
The international system of governance has once again reaffirmed its state of utter impotence. Not even the UN Security Council reacts to the atrocities, let alone the UNHCHR and its organs. Our best bet, we seem to believe, is to leave them be altogether. Refraining from arousing even regional conversations amongst the African nations we choose to remain in our barracks, numbed by the lessons we think we should have learned from more recent humanitarian interventions. Sadly, still unable to realize that inaction and passivity is sure to secure neither us, nor humanity, a brighter, more stable and promising future.
Kenyans were praised for their utter dedication to the principles of democracy and the political process as they stood in line to the voting polls for hours. An expressive number of organizations and governmental delegations (less Pan-Africanist than expected) were on site to support the process and assure the purity of the demos (or demon in disguise) at work. A case that reminds us more recently of Nigeria and more boldly (remarking the inappropriate nature of such impossible-to-oversee puppet shows) of Iraq.
This is a very sorrowful implication of the unravelling nature of the operation of identity building that Western society has chosen to achieve through the institution of human rights, amongst others. Whose rights and where do they originate? About these we have blatantly forgotten. After all, Kenya today is a mirror of a people, reflecting the face of humanity, that 'want' to express the universal dignity bestowed upon them as human beings on account of their own humanity.
Saturday, 17 November 2007
What are we really securing and for whom?
The Centre's most recent symposium on "Securing humanity: perspectives from international law" was a true success both from an academic legal and a humanistic perspective. The discussions reverberated in the audience's emotional impulses and successfully preserved a healthy tension and density in the air as an additional speaker commenced with their discourse.
Most interestingly, however, was the capturing discussion that was developed surrounding the question of "us" and "them", another way for dualizing the system and basing it on the preconceived premise that 'divisions' are innate and inherent and colonialism and dominion is inseperable from the ways of mankind. Instead of allowing us to conceptualize our ends and develop upon the means (lamenting to enter the ontological discussion that lurks into and within this discourse), it dooms us to dystopia (as the esteemed scholar amongst us mentioned) and is a further self-limiting, self-justificatory, exercise.
After a series of self-sufficient, but despite this, interdependent dialogues, the second panel presented two speakers who were able to ground the discussion in the pragmatic case studies of the operability of the law on the international platform. International Criminal law and International Human Rights applicable in the context of asylum and immigration law on the International, regional, but particularly, national arenas, have shown (undertaking a very trivial analysis) that international law has tripped over itself a number of times and continues to do so.
The nature of the doctrine of Universal Jurisdiction has been curtailed by the sovereignty of states, and the fully justified right to invoke State Responsibility under the secondary rules of international law has analogously been negated by the flaccid rules on Individual responsibility that, as a result of the non-concurrence of the two, allow for the preservation of state impunity in the most appalling cases.
On the other hand, UK Immigration law has become a true cesspool breeding creatively mechanisms to allow for the furtherance of human rights violations. We mentioned the deprivation of asylum seekers from social services and the complete and utter disregard for the principle of the Universality of human rights and the application of fundamental human rights to non-nationals (leaving only a very limited and restrictive margin of appreciation to the state). But where does "security" come in?
Have we not by choosing this course of conduct asserted that we are choosing "our" security over theirs (even though it may only be a question of racism and sterility of the more conservative, but nonetheless dominant, parts of society)? We could even see "security" as a means for protecting our societies from those that try to bring them down, in the very direct sense of the word, advocating actively for border security policies and the drastic cut-down in the number of migrants allowed in, by all means possible. This would bring us even further into the discussion of security and human rights and the questioning of whose human rights would we prioritize when push comes to shove. The present author boldly and brutally asserts: "ours!" If it ever came down to a clash between Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture) rights to a potential terrorist (who is likely to be tortured and persecuted if removed to his country of origin) and Article 2 ECHR (right to life) rights to the London tube riders, we can all foresee the likely outcome.
So we had established, superficially, that international law does not, because more likely it cannot, accomodate "humanity". Why? This very naive question can only be answered with another: What is "humanity"? What is the "accomodation" (to what extent and for whom)? This brings us back to the basic premise that it is almost always our "humanity" over theirs or vice versa. The often-neglected truth is that the "good life" (in all of its ingredients) is not an ever expanding cake; it is conclusively finite and its parameters are clearly conceivable.
We had awakened our chronic sense of disillusionment with the international legal order, and then confirmed it with a sense of striking but familiar data, and still, some of us continue to comfortably resign to sinking back into the self-justificatory exercise that we recognized, conceptualised and negated to begin with (a good example: what are we doing with the UN if we know what we are doing and we know what it is like?)
We may want to leave ourselves with a set of basic existential contemplations (whether individual or communitarian): Has our innocence been lost to such a profound degree that there is no way back out of the abyss? Has individualism (in the white, western sense) negated the very pure view of the role of the law in society? Has the international legal order become a prophesy that has brain-washed some, intensely convinced a large group of others, whilst left the rest in a state of unfathomable irritation?
Most interestingly, however, was the capturing discussion that was developed surrounding the question of "us" and "them", another way for dualizing the system and basing it on the preconceived premise that 'divisions' are innate and inherent and colonialism and dominion is inseperable from the ways of mankind. Instead of allowing us to conceptualize our ends and develop upon the means (lamenting to enter the ontological discussion that lurks into and within this discourse), it dooms us to dystopia (as the esteemed scholar amongst us mentioned) and is a further self-limiting, self-justificatory, exercise.
After a series of self-sufficient, but despite this, interdependent dialogues, the second panel presented two speakers who were able to ground the discussion in the pragmatic case studies of the operability of the law on the international platform. International Criminal law and International Human Rights applicable in the context of asylum and immigration law on the International, regional, but particularly, national arenas, have shown (undertaking a very trivial analysis) that international law has tripped over itself a number of times and continues to do so.
The nature of the doctrine of Universal Jurisdiction has been curtailed by the sovereignty of states, and the fully justified right to invoke State Responsibility under the secondary rules of international law has analogously been negated by the flaccid rules on Individual responsibility that, as a result of the non-concurrence of the two, allow for the preservation of state impunity in the most appalling cases.
On the other hand, UK Immigration law has become a true cesspool breeding creatively mechanisms to allow for the furtherance of human rights violations. We mentioned the deprivation of asylum seekers from social services and the complete and utter disregard for the principle of the Universality of human rights and the application of fundamental human rights to non-nationals (leaving only a very limited and restrictive margin of appreciation to the state). But where does "security" come in?
Have we not by choosing this course of conduct asserted that we are choosing "our" security over theirs (even though it may only be a question of racism and sterility of the more conservative, but nonetheless dominant, parts of society)? We could even see "security" as a means for protecting our societies from those that try to bring them down, in the very direct sense of the word, advocating actively for border security policies and the drastic cut-down in the number of migrants allowed in, by all means possible. This would bring us even further into the discussion of security and human rights and the questioning of whose human rights would we prioritize when push comes to shove. The present author boldly and brutally asserts: "ours!" If it ever came down to a clash between Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture) rights to a potential terrorist (who is likely to be tortured and persecuted if removed to his country of origin) and Article 2 ECHR (right to life) rights to the London tube riders, we can all foresee the likely outcome.
So we had established, superficially, that international law does not, because more likely it cannot, accomodate "humanity". Why? This very naive question can only be answered with another: What is "humanity"? What is the "accomodation" (to what extent and for whom)? This brings us back to the basic premise that it is almost always our "humanity" over theirs or vice versa. The often-neglected truth is that the "good life" (in all of its ingredients) is not an ever expanding cake; it is conclusively finite and its parameters are clearly conceivable.
We had awakened our chronic sense of disillusionment with the international legal order, and then confirmed it with a sense of striking but familiar data, and still, some of us continue to comfortably resign to sinking back into the self-justificatory exercise that we recognized, conceptualised and negated to begin with (a good example: what are we doing with the UN if we know what we are doing and we know what it is like?)
We may want to leave ourselves with a set of basic existential contemplations (whether individual or communitarian): Has our innocence been lost to such a profound degree that there is no way back out of the abyss? Has individualism (in the white, western sense) negated the very pure view of the role of the law in society? Has the international legal order become a prophesy that has brain-washed some, intensely convinced a large group of others, whilst left the rest in a state of unfathomable irritation?
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